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Abstract The purpose of this paper is to outline a possible approach to Benjamin’s figure of 
the dialectical image from the perspective of neither its content nor the philosophical issues it 
is supposed to represent but from the very dialectical tension immanent in it. I believe it is 
precisely due to that inner tension that the dialectical image conveys truth content as the 
eternal glimmer of transiency.   
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This paper deals with Walter Benjamin’s concept of the dialectical image with special 
reference  to its critical significance as it has been emphasized in Adorno’s critical 
interpretation of Benjamin writings. The concept itself carries the inevitable veil of an 
ambiguity programmed or coded into it by Benjamin himself; although this has already been  
discussed by several scholars no resolution has yet appearedi. Admittedly, even if the notion 






that it may be approached in a different manner than  suggested by some critics. This very 
problematical subject requires an adjustment of the methodological approach, amounting, in 
the case of Benjamin writings, to its degradation; thus methodology would abandon its 
illusory certitude in order to trace whatever escapes its identifying powers. Buck-Morss for 
instance claims that in order to unveil the hidden meaning of his fragmented works 
Benjamin’s own method of making present (Aktualisierung) should be applied, which in fact 
consists in utilizing it. In The Dialectics of Seeing Buck-Morss asserts that the reading of 
Benjamin’s oeuvre requires a materialist pedagogyii . 
Already in his dissertation Benjamin declares his philosophical stance as diverging 
from the Kantian and post-Kantian narrative by refuting its very axiom – the scientific idea of 
experience derived from Newton’s physicsiii. Thereby releasing his discourse from the 
methodological dogma of subjectivity Benjamin enabled himself to wander into the 
philosophically unfamiliar and uncomfortable sphere of concrete things, while aware of the 
constantly lurking peril of ambiguity and the danger of academic abandonment. In other 
words, Benjamin undertakes the hazardous intellectual path of, as Peter Burger indicates, 
thinking “against himself” (Burger 2003: 147) or as Adorno would put it: presenting a 
“philosophy directed against philosophy” (Adorno 1983: 235).  Hence Benjamin’s writings 
present a constellation of images bound together by the law of tension produced either by 
attraction or by distraction, which in fact denotes the same rule of interpretation – a delicate 
and complex matrix which is balanced and maintained by the inner coherence of Benjamin’s 
philosophical project. This coherence, I believe, is founded upon the law of the mirror 
resembling reflection – the complexity of an object or subject is indeed reflected in the 
complexity of the method. The tension appears to be the dialectic as such, as in his letter to 
Adorno Benjamin compares the forging of dialectics to the stretching of a bow (Benjamin 






thorough explanation of  the dialectical image as a binding concept, emphasizing that its 
“question remains open” until it proves its “value in the material itself”(89).  
Benjamin’s statement implies that his persistent philosophical aim is to follow the 
trace of things just as one who, while looking into the mirror, struggles to catch the glimpses 
of the world lurking behind his shoulder without falling into the abyssmal gaze of his own 
reflection. These characteristics of Benjamin’s project place him further from  philosophy and 
closer to literatureiv and offer essential insight into the  revolutionary and negative nature of 
literature itself. 
 
The dream image - tension and difference 
The mentioned ambiguity of Benjamin’s project is by nature difficult to pinpoint as it 
seems to be connected with an epistemological confusion emanating from the very figure of 
the dialectical image; the image refutes epistemological presuppositions. However, that does 
not mean that Benjamin naively claims that Kant’s critique has never taken place and that 
philosophy should carry on with no further regard to it. On the contrary, Benjamin recognizes 
that there is something prior to meaning and the self, and that is the image. 
Image and language take precedence … Not only before meaning. Also before the self. 
(Benjamin 2005: 208) 
It seems to be the same epistemological confusion that is also a characteristic of the 
debate on the cognitive value of a dream. Perhaps that is why Benjamin initially thought of 







Ambiguity is the figurative appearance of the dialectic, the law of the dialectic at a 
standstill. This standstill is Utopia, and the dialectical image therefore a dream image. 
(Benjamin 1999: 171) 
 
In the above passage from The Arcades Project  the German philosopher indicates that 
the instant the dialectics is forced to a standstill it precipitates a reflecting image. As the 
image is filled with adequate inner tension it in turn produces ambiguity. However, I believe 
the notion of a dream image directly refers to Utopia, because ‘image’ is something other than 
thought. The standstill can only be represented by a picture, or a photograph; it cannot be 
seized or maintained otherwise than momentarily due to its origin in the purely dialectical 
movement of thought. Hence Benjamin continues: 
 
To thinking belongs the movement as well as arrest of thoughts. Where thinking comes 
to a standstill in a constellation saturated with tensions  - there the dialectical image 
appears. It is the caesura in the movement of thought. (475) 
  
Here, in the light of Benjamin’s claim a natural question arises: whether the arrest of 
thought is possible at all. It is rather difficult to consider thinking in a static manner; it seems 
that the dialectical image as a standstill is in fact Utopia, a dream image which belongs to the 
artificial sphere of thinking about thinking. However, this conclusion does not imply that 
Benjamin’s  critique of idealism is defective. On the contrary, it proves Benjamin’s great 
awareness of the German philosophical tradition and his careful approach to its problematics; 






insight of the waking consciousness. Admittedly, it is impossible to discontinue the flow of 
thought, but it is in fact possible to differentiate it by realizing and conceptualizing the flow as 
flow. This mindfulness is only momentary in its nature, however. 
In his correspondence with Adorno Benjamin reveals significant aspects of his concept 
of the dialectical image:   
 
The dialectical image does not simply copy the dream(…). But it certainly does seem to 
me that the former contains within itself the exemplary instances, the interruptions of 
waking consciousness, and that indeed it is precisely from such places that the figure of 
the dialectical image first produces itself like that of a star composed of many glittering 
points. Here too, therefore,  the bow needs to be stretched, and a dialectic forged: that 
between the image and the act of waking. (Benjamin 2001: 119) 
 
In addressing Adorno’s doubts on defining the dialectical image as a dream image 
Benjamin appears to emphasize that while neither the content of the image, nor what it 
reflects are crucial; the very tension it conveys and the irreducibility of its components are. 
The irreducibility is that which glimmers through the image’s delicate texture. In the 
transitory moment of awaking it is impossible to tell the dream and reality apart as this would 
mean denoting one as the dominant (real) one, and yet it seems equally impossible to reduce 
one to the other. Awaking is the exact instant when illusory subjectivity is collapsing, why no 
structure of the real is yet constituted. That is the precise now of knowability.  
The emergent mode of thinking through difference may cause one to consider 






This affinity has already been suggested by some scholars in the context of the deconstructive 
aspects of Benjamin’s conclusions on allegoryv. Nevertheless, there seem to be crucial factors 
to argue against this suggestion, as I will do in the following.  
I believe the essential characteristic of the dialectical image that flashes through the 
momentary critical arrest of thought resides in the fact that it provides insight into the reverse 
side of the cognitive act in reflecting its purely negative component. In this regard Benjamin 
contradicts the affirmative epistemological conclusions of Kant and especially Fichte in order 
to contradict Hegel’s restrictions and enter “houses of ill repute” (Adorno 1992: 221).     
 
Is awaking perhaps the synthesis of dream consciousness (as thesis) and waking 
consciousness (as antithesis)? Then the moment of awakening would be identical with 
the “now of knowability” in which things put on their true – Surrealist - face. Thus in 
Proust, the importance of staking an entire life on life’s supremely dialectical point of 
rupture: awakening. (Benjamin 1999: 463-464) 
 
The Surrealist face understood as the true face of things, apart from facilitating a 
different cognitive perspective on German philosophyvi, essentially appears to imply that it is 
impossible to determine the difference between the real and the illusory, since the real 
dissolves into dream. Even if Benjamin rejects the naïve metaphysical claim to the 
phenomenal sphere of reality, he also discards the presupposition of subjectivity’s direct 
correspondence with that sphere.  
We may therefore ask: what is left of de-mythologized awareness and knowledge in 






essay on Surrealism Benjamin seems to connect the revolutionary authenticity of the surrealist 
movement with the central concept of experience as a “loosening of the self” (Benjamin 2005: 
208) for which poetry is only a medium. The concept reveals the cognitive presupposition that  
“language takes precedence” emphasized at the beginning of this article. 
In the same essay Benjamin claims that, unlike Proust mentioned in the above passage 
from The Arcades Project, for surrealists life “seemed worth living only where the threshold 
between waking and sleeping was worn away” (208), which - although it defines the 
Surrealist face of things - is in fact devoid of any critical element as well as reference to the 
past.  
 
Remembrance and Recognizability. 
Thus, if following the trace of Proust’s memoire involontaire (involuntary memory) we 
should hold on to the idea of the dream as a content of the dialectical image, the dream would 
be about the past, or rather what has been.  
 
It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on 
what is past; rather, an image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash 
with the now to form a constellation. In other words: image is dialectics at a standstill. 
For while the relation of the present to the past is purely temporal, the relation of what-
has-been to the now is dialectical: not temporal in nature but figural. Only dialectical 







The moment of ‘now’ carries the weight of recognizability and its reference to the past. 
However, past content is not a simple recollection as it is in an involuntary memory. As Marc 
de Wilde states, Benjamin’s aim is not to “restore the past in its original state” but instead he 
“juxtaposes it with the present, seeking to activate its critical potential” (Wilde 2009: 189). 
What is the nature of the dialectical image’s reference to the past and the present? 
 
The image that is read—which is to say, the image in the now of its recognizability—
bears to the highest degree the imprint of the perilous critical moment on which all 
reading is founded. (Benjamin 1999: 463) 
 
It seems there is one condition under which it is possible to read the dialectical image, 
that is it needs to be recognized in the present following the rule of displaced similarity.  
Thereby the dialectical image appears to be a form of déja vu where, just as previously 
subjectivity collapsed in the cognitive aspect of the image, the present collapses and reveals 
what has been as its origin or premise. Yet, both of these moments – the past and the present 
in the dialectical image simply lose their grip, or their power over each other. They are neither 
different nor the same but form a constellation as did previously the dream and the real. The 
truth resides in neither of them. Rather, it glitters through the collapse of their illusory 
supremacy.  
Mark de Wilde continues, stating that “the dialectical image is grounded in a theological 
responsibility to save the past from forces of forgetting  - and ultimately, to save it from 
history itself” (Wilde 2009: 189). The interpretation emphasizing a “silent call for justice” is 
in close affinity with Adorno’s reflections in his work on Kierkegaard’s aesthetics, where he 






‘transparentness’ and the profound gaze that without any resistance penetrates the transparent.” 
(Adorno 1999:72) The presented figure of truth carries an immanent reference to the eternalvii and 
thereby corresponds with Benjamin’s idea of the messianic; and only through remembrance which 
unveils the constellation of past and present may one reach the elusive truth. Adorno argues that: 
 
Benjamin's images are not linked with nature as moments of a self-identical ontology 
but rather in the name of death, of transience as the supreme category of natural 
existence, the category toward which Benjamin’s thought advances. What is eternal in 
them is only the transient.  (Adorno 1992: 226) 
 
In the passage from Introduction to Benjamin’s Shriften Adorno reveals that Benjamin’s 
method captured in the images essentially consists in forging a reversed dialectics which 
internal dynamic aims at mapping out the irreducible component of  things – its transience. 
Paradoxically this transience constitutes a mark of the eternal conceived as not an abstract 
emptiness but as a concrete, non-identical trace of substantial world.       
 
The Dialectical Image and Language. 
In order to further elucidate the figure of the dialectical image it essential to follow the 
hint of another tension intrinsic in language, a tension in and by which Benjamin claims the 
dialectical image exists. In his article on the conception of the dialectical image in terms of its 
relation to language Eli Friedlander implies a universality of language comparable to that 








(…) the distinction between what we say by means of, or through, language, and what 
can be revealed in language is at the same time a distinction between what we say and 
what communicates itself in language. 
 
At first glance it seems like an important suggestion if one considers language as a 
constellation with a double meaning, i.e. as a configuration of fixed stars or, given its 
astrological connotations, a formation of heavens as spheres in a particular momentix that 
allows the ‘letter’, language, to manifest itself. However,  the reference unintentionally 
conveyed through language emerges from within, not from the universality of the system but 
from the particular, concrete strain that founds the system. Benjamin puts great emphasis 
upon the smallest element of language: 
 
Its position is naturally not an arbitrary one. It is to be found in a word, where the 
tension between the dialectical opposites is greatest. Hence, the object constructed in 
the materialist presentation of history is itself the dialectical image. The letter is 
identical with the historical object; it justifies its violent expulsion from the continuum 
of the historical process. (Benjamin 1999: 475) 
 
The dialectical tension of a word and the violent expulsion of the dialectical image from the 
historical process are bound together essentially by their negativity. Language as an “archive of 
nonsensous similarities” (Benjamin 2005: 697) seems to be a constellation itself originating in 
our magical mimetic capacity, including the mimetic genius from which astrological practices 
arise. Hence language represents mimetic power in its purest meaning, and it represents 







The greater the difference between the opposites, the greater the tension issuing from the 
inner forces of language struggling to sustain meaning. And yet, in the smallest components 
of language,  i.e. words, the nonsensousness of forced similarity is most visible. In a profound 
sense, words fail to grasp things in themselves; yet by merely naming things words convey a 
tension which ironically indicates and manifests the existence of things in themselves. This 
tension contradicts and negates idealism. Thus, Adrono claims	  in	  Kierkegaard: Construction 
of the Aesthetic in the dialectical image nature is sustained. 
 
For it is not as the continuously living and present that nature prevails in the dialectic. 
Dialectics comes to a stop in the image and cites the mythical in the historically most 
recent as the distant past: nature as proto-history (Adorno 1999: 54).  
 
From the above passage the conclusion may be drawn that in dialectics nature is preserved, and 
in the dialectical image it is recognized as though in a mirror. Thereby the image constitutes a critical 
inner mirror within the enchanted reality. In a flash it captures a reversed dialectics, as to force the 
dialectics into standstill means to reverse it. Similarly if we gaze into the mirror the reflection we 
observe is indeed reversed.  Hence  Adorno states that in order “to reach truth one must pierce through 
every negativity […] the piece of music must be played backwards; otherwise the enchantment is not 
broken.” (84) The enchantment is history itself and it prevails, and yet only within and through history 
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